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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. 
DALE DEMONT HARDY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010396-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appellant Dale Hardy was criminally charged and convicted in two separate cases 
of violating a protective order. The conviction in Case No. 991200131 ("Case No. 131") 
was recorded as a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999), and 
the two convictions in Case No. 991200873 ("Case No. 873") were recorded as third 
degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999). Hardy appealed from the entry 
of judgment in both cases, and this Court consolidated the cases for the appeal. 
The facts relevant to each case are the same. Hardy and his estranged wife, 
Courtney, have four children. In January 1999, Courtney obtained a protective order 
prohibiting Hardy from "directly or indirectly" contacting or communicating with her. 
(Case No. 873, Exhibit P2.) The order allowed Hardy visitation with the children. 
In January 1999, Hardy allegedly violated the protective order. (See Case No. 
131:1-2.) In April 1999, he appeared before a trial judge on the violation and he agreed 
to a plea in abeyance, where he would abstain from further violating the order for one 
year. At the expiration of the year, the judge would enter a "not guilty" plea in the matter 
and dismiss the case. (Case No. 131:8-12.) 
In July 1999, the state alleged new violations of the protective order against Hardy 
for mailing letters to his children. The children lived with Courtney. Based on evidence 
of the letters, the judge in Case No. 131 withdrew the plea in abeyance and entered a 
guilty plea against Hardy for a misdemeanor offense; and he entered an order in Case No. 
873, binding Hardy over for trial on the new violations. In August 2000, a jury convicted 
Hardy of the new violations, which were entered as third degree felonies. 
On appeal, Hardy is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in each case. That 
analysis requires consideration of the criminal statutes at issue, Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-
4.2(2)(b) (1998) and 76-5-108 (1999). Hardy maintains the letters he sent to his children 
were not prohibited by the statutory provisions or the protective order. (Brief of 
Appellant, Point I.) The convictions must be reversed. 
In response to Hardy's claims, the state has identified the facts at trial, but has 
failed to present legal analysis concerning the criminal statutory provisions at issue. (See 
State's Brief of Appellee ("State's Brief), Point II.) In the end, there is a gap in the 
state's evidence, as set forth in Hardy's opening brief and as further set forth herein. 
Hardy requests that this Court reverse the convictions. 
Hardy also is challenging the constitutionality of the criminal provisions at issue. 
The provisions make it illegal for a "respondent" to directly/indirectly contact/communi-
cate with a "petitioner," who has obtained a protective order. The statutory provisions fail 
to define relevant terms and they serve to criminalize a potentially huge universe of 
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innocent conduct. The criminal provisions are unconstitutional. 
In response to Hardy's constitutional arguments, the state claims Hardy failed in 
part to preserve his arguments, and he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
the provisions enforced against him. (State's Brief, Points III, IV, VI.) Those claims are 
incorrect. In addition, the state addresses related but irrelevant provisions. In the end, the 
state fails to engage in any pertinent discussion concerning the provisions that criminalize 
direct/indirect contact/communication. The criminal provisions must be stricken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE DOES NOT SERIOUSLY DEFEND THE 
CONVICTIONS IT OBTAINED BELOW. THE SPARE BRIEFING ON 
THE SUFFICIENCY ISSUES SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS A 
CONCESSION ON THE STATE'S PART. COMPELLING REVERSAL. 
Utah appellate courts have specified that a sufficiency analysis begins with the 
criminal statute at issue, where the court will look to the statute to identify the elements 
that make up the offense.' Hardy has identified the relevant statutory provisions at issue 
in this case. (Brief of Appellant, Point LA. (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1, et. seq. 
(1998); 76-5-108 (1999); and 77-36-1 (1999)). In sum, the Cohabitant Abuse Act allows 
a "petitioner" to obtain a protective order against a "respondent." Among other things, 
the order may prohibit the respondent from contacting or otherwise communicating with 
1 See Brief of Appellant, 13 (citing State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,1215 (Utah 1993); 
State v.Merila. 966 P.2d 270,272 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Smith. 927 P.2d 649,651 
(Utah App. 1996); State v. Singh. 819 P.2d 356, 358-59 (Utah App. 1991); U.S. v. Cicco. 
10 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Hollis. 971 F.2d 1441(10th Cir. 1992), cert, 
denied. 507 U.S. 985 (1993); U.S. v. Levine. 41 F.3d 607,610-11 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
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the petitioner, either directly or indirectly. Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-2; 30-6-4.2(2)(b). 
According to Utah law, if the respondent intentionally or knowingly violates that 
particular provision of the protective order, the state may criminally prosecute and punish 
him for the violation. Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i); 76-5-108; see infra. 
note 5, herein; (Brief of Appellant, Point I.A.(1).). 
In civil proceedings below, Courtney obtained a protective order against Hardy. 
The order in relevant part prohibited Hardy from "contacting" or "otherwise 
communicating" with her, "directly or indirectly." (Case No 873, Exhibit P2); Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-6-4.2(2)(b). After officials served the order on Hardy, he mailed letters to his 
children. Thereafter, Hardy was prosecuted for "communicating with" Courtney in 
violation of the protective order, under §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108. 
As set forth in Hardy's opening brief, when the legislature enacted § 30-6-
4.2(2)(b) it failed to define relevant terms. (Brief of Appellant, Point I.A.(2).) Specifi-
cally, the legislature failed to define "contacting," "otherwise communicating," "directly" 
or "indirectly." (Id,) Thus, Hardy has asked this Court to use the traditional tools of 
statutory construction to define those terms and to interpret the statute as follows: Before 
the state may obtain a criminal conviction for a violation of the protective order as set 
forth at § 30-6-4.2(2)(b), it must prove that the contact/communication was violent, 
abusive, threatening, or harassing to the petitioner. (Brief of Appellant, Point I.A.(3).) 
The state does not take issue with that interpretation. (See State's Brief, Points I & 
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II.) Indeed, the state has not discussed the relevant statutory terms in its analysis. (See 
State's Brief, Points I & II.) In addition, in response to Hardy's argument concerning the 
felony convictions, the state does not dispute that the prosecutor failed to present 
evidence to support that the letters were a contact or communication with Courtney. 
(State's Brief, Point II.) For the reasons more fully set forth in Hardy's opening brief and 
below, Hardy is entitled to an order reversing the convictions. 
A. IN ITS ANALYSIS CONCERNING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE FOR THE MISDEMEANOR CONVICTION. THE STATE SIMPLY 
HAS CITED TO EVIDENCE THAT HARDY WROTE LETTERS TO HIS 
CHILDREN. THAT IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A "CONTACT" OR 
"COMMUNICATION" WITH COURTNEY. 
In the sufficiency analysis for Case No. 131, the state asserts that the trial judge 
properly withdrew the plea in abeyance and entered a guilty plea against Hardy for 
writing letters to his children. According to the state, those letters constituted a violation 
of the permanent protective order, which prohibited Hardy from engaging in "any contact 
or communication with his estranged wife." (See State's Brief, 13.) The state claims the 
following facts support the determination that Hardy "intended the letters [to be] for 
[Courtney], even though [Hardy] addressed them to his children" (id , 15): 
"[Defendant wrote two letters [dated June 7 and June 24] addressed to his children 
at the residence they shared with [Courtney]." 
* * * 
M[T]he oldest of [the] four children was eight at the time and had a form of autism. 
T. 93:11. The other three children were six and under. T. 93:10-11. None of the 
children read at the time they received the letters. T. 93:12." 
(State's Brief, 13,14.) 
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In its sufficiency analysis, the state also alludes to the alleged "content of the 
letters - the focus on marital problems, the references to prior marital conversations, and 
the implicit accusations of blame." (State's Brief, 14; but see the Letters at Case No. 873, 
Exhibits P10 and PI 1.) That is the total evidence identified by the state to support a 
violation of the protective order.2 
The state does not dispute the following: the record fails to support that the letters 
were harassing, threatening, abusive or violent; and it fails to support that the letters 
constituted a danger of abuse or manipulation to Courtney. Also, the record fails to 
support any "veiled threat[] and/or harassment." (See State's Brief, 21.) The criminal 
provisions set forth at §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108 should not be construed to 
apply here, where there is no evidence of criminally offensive conduct. (See Brief of 
Appellant, Points I & II; infra. Point II, below.) The evidence is insufficient to support 
withdrawal of the plea in abeyance and entry of the misdemeanor conviction. 
B. IN ITS ANALYSIS FOR THE FELONY CONVICTIONS, THE STATE 
DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT IT FAILED TO MAKE ANY CONNECTION 
BETWEEN THE LETTERS AND COURTNEY. 
In response to Hardy's sufficiency argument as it relates to the felony convictions 
(Case No. 873), the state claims the following evidence was presented to the jury to 
support that Hardy contacted, or otherwise communicated with Courtney, directly or 
2 The state also makes reference to the prosecutor's argument in the lower court that "the 
letters were intended for Ms. Hardy." (State's Brief, 14.) Counsel's argument is not 
evidence. See State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990). 
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indirectly, in violation of §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108: 
At trial, the jury heard evidence of the children's ages and their inability to read. 
T. 178:85-86. The June 7 and June 24 letters were entered into evidence and their 
mature content highlighted. T. 178:112-116. In addition, police officers testified 
that on two different occasions they explained to defendant that he could not write 
letters to his wife. T. 178:67-69,76-77. 
(State's Brief, 15.) 
As set forth in Hardy's opening brief, that evidence is insufficient. M[T]here [is] an 
evidentiary void in the state's case." (Brief of Appellant, 25.) 
The state failed to present evidence to support that the letters were 
somehow for Courtney. Specifically, there is no indication on the face of the 
letters that they were a form of communication or contact intended for Courtney, 
directly or indirectly, where the letters were addressed to the children. 
(See Exhibit P10 and PI 1.) In addition, the state failed to show that any part of 
either letter constituted a contact/communication with Courtney. That is, the state 
failed to show that Hardy expected the children to communicate any part of the 
letters to Courtney; it failed to show that Hardy otherwise used the children to 
communicate indirectly with Courtney; and it failed to show that the letters were in 
any way for Courtney's benefit. (Case No. 873 at 178.) 
Further, there is no indication that Courtney believed the letters were 
intended for her, either directly or indirectly (see Case No. 873 at 178:111-18,123-
24, (Courtney's testimony regarding the June 7 and 24 letters)). * * * 
Finally, based on the evidence presented at trial in this case, it would be 
inappropriate for the jury to infer that the letters were for Courtney. Specifically, 
evidence was presented to support that the letters were for the children at a later 
date, when they could understand the content. (See Case No. 873 at 178:129 
(Courtney testified the children eventually probably would be able to understand 
the letters).) While the jury was at liberty to disregard Courtney's testimony to 
that effect, such disregard simply would create a void in the matter. The record 
still lacked evidence to support that the letters were for Courtney. 
(Brief of Appellant, 25-26 (note and cites omitted).) 
In sum, evidence that the letters contained mature content for the children at their 
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current ages was insufficient. Section 30-6-4.2(2)(b) and the protective order did not pro-
hibit Hardy from sending letters to the children discussing his feelings. The evidence 
fails to support that Hardy contacted or communicated with Courtney. The felony 
convictions must be reversed. (Brief of Appellant, Point I.B.(l).) 
POINT II. IN RESPONSE TO HARDY'S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 30-6-4.2(2Vb) AS A CRIMINAL 
PROVISION. THE STATE HAS DISCUSSED THE PURPOSE SERVED BY 
THE PROTECTIVE ORDER. WHICH IS NOT IN ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
AND IT HAS RAISED INAPPLICABLE PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS. 
This Court may avoid the constitutional issues raised on appeal by resolving the 
sufficiency issues above in Hardy's favor. In the event this Court finds that the evidence 
was insufficient to support the convictions, this Court will not need to address the 
remaining claims. See Merila. 966 P.2d at 273 (in view of the Court's opinion on the suf-
ficiency issue, "we need not address the other arguments raised on appeal"); Provo City v. 
Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, ^ J16,1 P.3d 1113 (where court resolved a dispositive issue in 
favor of defense, it was not necessary to reach remaining issues on appeal). 
In the event this Court upholds the convictions, Hardy maintains that the statutory 
provisions defining the criminal conduct here are unconstitutional. (See Brief of 
Appellant, Point II.) The provisions that serve to criminally penalize the defendant are 
vague, ambiguous and overbroad, in violation of the due process clause of the federal 
constitution, and in violation of the First Amendment. They must be stricken. 
In response to Hardy's constitutional claims, the state has made procedural 
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arguments and it has defended legislation relating to the initial entry of a protective order 
in civil proceedings. (See State's Brief, 20-21 (discussing the purpose of protective 
orders).) Those arguments are irrelevant. The issues in this case relate to the criminal 
provisions. Hardy is attacking the broad, sweeping provisions that allow the state to 
criminally punish him for innocuous letters. (See State's Brief, 19 (recognizing that 
Hardy is challenging the provisions that subject him to criminal punishment for letters 
that express "sorrow, remorse and devotion").) For the reasons set forth below, this Court 
should disregard the state's brief as it relates to the constitutional issues. 
A. THE STATE'S OVERBREADTH ARGUMENT DOES NOT ADDRESS 
THE CRIMINAL ASPECTS OF THE PROVISIONS AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
As set forth in Hardy's opening brief, the legislature may regulate conduct and 
speech that is harassing, violent, abusive, threatening, libelous, or obscene, or that con-
stitutes extortion, perjury, conspiracy, or fraud.3 The legislature may not enact broad 
criminal provisions that sweep within their ambit innocent conduct. 
In Hardy's opening brief, he argued the following: 
Assuming arguendo the Cohabitant Abuse Act serves to protect petitioners — who 
are reasonably in fear of physical harm — from domestic abuse, intimidation, 
violence, threats, and harassment, Hardy maintains that relevant portions of § 30-
6-4.2(2)(b) and the protective order are not carefully drawn so as to serve that 
purpose. Rather, the provisions are so broadly worded that they sweep within their 
ambit protected communication. 
3 See Brief of Appellant, 42 (citing Whatcott 2000 UT App 86,1J10; State v. Brown, 
748 P.2d 276,279 (Wash. App. 1988); State v. Chung. 862 P.2d 1063,1072 (Haw. 1993); 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Roth v. 
IIS,, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). 
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On the face of § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) there is no attempt to distinguish between 
criminal communication or contact, and innocent communication or contact. That 
is, whether the communications are intimidating, threatening, abusive, violent or 
harassing; whether they engender fear; whether they constitute "fighting words"; 
or whether they relate to health insurance or visitation issues concerning the 
children, they are all treated alike, subject to criminal prosecution and penalty 
under § 30-6-4.2(2)(b). Further there is no attempt to distinguish between 
communications in public places (i.e. in a court conference room with an attorney) 
and communications at or in the sanctity of the petitioner's residence. 
Indeed, the phrase that prohibits direct/indirect communication/contact 
cannot be said "sufficiently to inform the ordinary person" that the statute is meant 
to distinguish between "allowable areajs] of state control" and "activities that in 
ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech." On that 
basis, the language is overly broad. 
(Brief of Appellant, 45-46 (cites omitted)); (State's Brief, 20 (recognizing that a statute is 
overbroad if it criminalizes constitutionally protected activity).)4 
In response to Hardy's argument, the state claims that the Cohabitant Abuse Act, 
which authorizes protective orders, was carefully tailored to protect petitioners from abu-
sive/violent conduct. The state also discusses the purposes served with the entry of a pro-
tective order. (State's Brief, 20-22 (court may enter protective order to avoid abuse).) 
The state claims that in connection with entering a protective order, a trial court may re-
strict contact/communication between the petitioner and respondent. (State's Brief, 21.) 
Hardy does not take issue with the provisions that allow for the entry of a 
4 Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) allows a court to enter a protective order prohibiting 
respondent from "contacting" or "otherwise communicating" with petitioner, either 
"directly or indirectly." Sections 76-5-108 and 30-6-4.2(5)(a)(i) specify that a violation 
of subsection (2)(b) shall constitute a criminal offense. Since subsection (2)(b) actually 
defines the criminal conduct at issue, Hardy has attacked that specific provision as 
unconstitutional. It is overly broad, vague and ambiguous. (Brief of Appellant, Point II.) 
10 
protective order. Indeed, a civil court has discretion to enter such an order. According to 
§ 30-6-4.2, a court may enter a protective order for "any further relief that the court 
considers necessary to provide for the safety and welfare of the petitioner and any 
designated family or household member." Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(2)(g). In addition, 
Hardy does not take issue here with the fact that a protective order was entered in the civil 
case, Hardv v. Hardv. Case No. 994900133CA. (Case No. 873, Exhibit P2.) 
Hardy's appeal relates to the provisions that define criminal conduct and were used 
by the prosecutor to obtain convictions in Case Nos. 131 and 873. 
After the civil court entered a protective order in Hardy v. Hardy, the state filed 
criminal charges against Hardy for writing letters to his children. The state alleged that 
Hardy violated the protective order, and it prosecuted him for the alleged offenses under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i), and 76-5-108. Those statutory provisions 
make it a crime to violate certain portions of the protective order.5 
5 According to the relevant statutory provisions, not all violations of the protective order 
constitute a crime. If a respondent makes threats of violence or abuse or harasses the 
petitioner, that conduct may be criminally prosecuted. Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(a), 
(2)(b), (2)(c), (2)(d) (respondent's use of a weapon that threatens petitioner constitutes a 
crime), (5)(a)(i); 76-5-106 (1999) (defining "harassment"). If the respondent denies the 
petitioner the use/possession of certain marital assets, that conduct may be criminally 
prosecuted. Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(2)(e), (5)(a)(i). 
Other violations of the protective order constitute a "civil violation," which will 
subject the respondent to "contempt proceedings." For example, if the respondent 
violates the child custody provisions, or the provision that affords "further relief1 for the 
safety and welfare of the petitioner and family, that conduct will constitute a civil 
violation. Id at -4.2(2)(f), (g), (5)(a)(ii). 
While the general language of § 76-5-108 makes it criminal for a respondent to 
intentionally/knowingly violate a protective order, not every violation is a crime. The 
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Thus, while the civil court may have acted properly in granting a protective order 
in Hardy v. Hardy* that does not address the constitutionality of the criminal provisions 
used to prosecute and punish Hardy. The legislature has used § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) and the 
protective order to define an offense in such broad terms, that the provisions embrace and 
criminalize innocent conduct. Here, Hardy was criminally convicted under broadly 
worded provisions for innocuous letters to his children. (Brief of Appellant, Point II.) 
In further response to Hardy's constitutional arguments, the state seems to claim 
that the criminal provisions at issue here are proper because they prevent communications 
"that may appear innocent, but in fact [are] not." (State's Brief, 21.) Also, the state 
seems to claim that the provisions criminalize contacts/communications that "may 
constitute veiled threats; and/or harassment" or that may "escalate into abuse." (Id.) 
Assuming, arguendo, the state is correct and the criminal provisions were meant to 
apply in those limited circumstances, the provisions here are overbroad where they also 
criminalize communications that are innocent. That is unconstitutional. (Brief of 
Appellant, Point II.) Stated another way, in Hardy's opening brief, he argued that this 
Court may interpret the statutory provisions at issue to apply only when the state has 
established that the contact/communication at issue constitutes a threat, harassment, 
specific language of § 30-6-4.2(5)(a)(i) identifies when a criminal violation of a 
protective order occurs. Utah courts have ruled that specific statutory provisions govern 
over general provisions. See State v. Lowder. 889 P.2d 412,414 (Utah 1994) (specific 
statute controls over general statute). Thus, a criminal violation occurs when §§ 30-6-
4.2(5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108 are read together, in harmony. 
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abuse, or violence. Such an interpretation will avoid constitutional difficulties. (See Brief 
of Appellant, Point I.A.(3).) Unless the prosecutor is held to such proof, the relevant 
provisions fail to distinguish between communications that "may appear innocent" but "in 
fact [are] not" (State's Brief, 21), and communications that in fact are innocent. 
Indeed, as they stand, the criminal provisions at issue here are so broadly worded 
that they fail to distinguish between innocent communications versus veiled threats. They 
sweep within their ambit "a potentially huge universe of otherwise legitimate" conduct. 
Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, [^11. The provisions are unconstitutionally overbroad. 
Next, the state justifies the broadly-worded provisions by claiming it has "a legiti-
mate interest in "preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and 
women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits.'" (State's Brief, 
21.) In support of that claim, the state has cited to Frisbv v. Schultz. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
That case is inapplicable. It concerns restrictions on free speech in a "public forum." 
In Frisbv. abortion protestors challenged an ordinance that banned picketing in a 
residential area. The ordinance prohibited the protestors from picketing outside a 
doctor's home. WL at 476. The Court upheld the regulation on the basis that it did not 
single out any particular person or group in its prohibitions, it did not ban picketers in 
general from residential areas, and it allowed picketers to deliver their message in the 
residential area in other ways. See id. at 483-84,6 Also, the prohibition served a 
6 The Supreme Court found that the ordinance left open "ample alternative channels of 
communication," Frisbv. 487 U.S. at 488, for picketers who wished to deliver their mes-
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legitimate purpose: it kept picketers from trapping a person in his own home and 
subjecting him to offensive speech, "The First Amendment permits the government to 
prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the 
objectionable speech." Id. at 487. 
In upholding the ordinance, the Court in Frisby reiterated that while residential 
sanctity is important, in other circumstances residents are responsible to "avoid speech 
they do not want to hear." Id. at 484. The Court emphasized that it would strike a law 
that completely banned expressive activity. Id at 485 (cites omitted). 
The tensions between free speech in a "public forum" and residential sanctity iden-
tified in Frisbv are not relevant here. As set forth in Hardy's opening brief, the criminal 
provisions here were not drafted to restrict communications that interfered with the sanc-
tity of the home. That is, under §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108, a respondent is 
subjected to criminal prosecution whether he communicates child custody issues or health 
insurance concerns with the petitioner at home, on di public street, or in a court conference 
room, face-to-face or through a third party. (See Brief of Appellant, 45.) The criminal 
provisions are all-encompassing. They prohibit all communications, including innocent 
communications, and communications that are not directed at the petitioner. 
The provisions here do not implicate the "public forum" analysis identified in 
sage to residents. For example, while the picketers would be prohibited from gathering 
outside the doctor's home and subjecting him to their offensive message, the picketers 
could distribute literature or use the mails to deliver the same message. Id at 484. 
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Frisby. See Reno v.ACLlL 521 U.S. 844, 859, 871-72, 879-80 (1997) (broadly worded 
provisions that prohibited "obscene" or "indecent" messages were unconstitutional under 
the overbreadth/vagueness analysis; the "time, place, and manner" analysis for speech in a 
"public forum" was inapplicable and would not save the provisions).7 
Under the proper analysis, state and federal courts recently have stricken criminal 
provisions that were overly broad, even though such provisions arguably preserved 
sanctity in the home. See Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, ^ [12 (striking broadly worded 
telephone harassment statute, which would prohibit "unwanted telephone solicitations 
made to a private home during the dinner hour"); Reno. 521 U.S. 844 (striking statute 
seeking to protect minors from harmful materials). 
Next, the state claims "individuals do not have an unfettered First Amendment 
right to send letters to unwilling recipients... 4[A] mailer's right to communicate must 
stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee.'" (State's Brief, 22.) Assuming, 
arguendo, that is correct, it is irrelevant for several reasons. First, Hardy sent letters to 
his children. There is no evidence to support they were "unwilling recipients." 
Second, the state has cited to Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't 397 U.S. 728 
(1970), in support of its proposition. (State's Brief, 22.) Rowan is inapplicable. There, 
7 In any event, the criminal provisions here would fail the "public forum" analysis set 
forth in Frisby because they do not leave open any "alternative forum" or channel of com-
munication for the exchange of protected, innocent expressions or ideas. Pursuant to §§ 
30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108, a respondent is subjected to criminal prosecution 
for all forms of communication with a petitioner, even "indirect" communication where 
the respondent has used an attorney to deliver the message. (Brief of Appellant, Point II.) 
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the Court considered a statute that insulated households from "lewd and salacious" 
mailings. Rowan. 397 U.S. at 731. The statute required the Postmaster General, upon an 
addressee's request, to order a "sender" to remove the addressee's name from the sen-
der's mailing list. Id at 729-30. The government's role in the matter was limited. Id at 
733-34. If the sender violated the order, the Postmaster General and district court could 
conduct a hearing for entry of a compliance order. Id at 738-39. The analysis in Rowan 
is irrelevant, since it does not concern criminal prosecution for sending unwanted mail. 
Third, the state does not suggest in its brief that the Utah legislature enacted the 
criminal provisions at issue in this case to cut down on unwanted mail. In fact, the pro-
visions that define criminal conduct here are far more reaching. Sections 30-6-4.2(2)(b), 
(5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108 serve to criminally punish a respondent for face-to-face communi-
cations with the petitioner about such issues as health insurance; and communications 
through a third party (indirect) about many innocuous matters. 
In this case, the state has failed to identify a legitimate basis for criminally penali-
zing a respondent for all forms of contact/communication, including indirect, innocuous 
communications. In addition, the state has failed to address the inconsistencies in Utah 
law and the protective order, where a "respondent" may be required under the protective 
order to cooperate with petitioner about financial issues, and simultaneously prosecuted 
for communicating with the petitioner about such matters. (Brief of Appellant, 34-35.) 
The state also has failed to show how the criminal provisions here were 
16 
sufficiently tailored to ensure that they do not infringe on First Amendment rights. 
In this case, Hardy was prosecuted under legislation that made it a crime to engage 
in all forms of communication, direct and indirect, with a petitioner. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) & 76-5-108; (Case No 873, Exhibit P2). Although the letters 
were innocuous and addressed to Hardy's children, the trial court considered them to be 
sufficient to send the matter to the jury for a criminal verdict. In that regard, the trial 
court endorsed a broad reading of the provisions. That reading ran afoul of the "well-
established principle that statutes will be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties." 
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483. The criminal provisions must be stricken as overly broad. 
B. ALTHOUGH THE STATE CLAIMS THE PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
ADEQUATELY DEFINE A CRIME. THE STATE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY 
WHAT THE RELEVANT TERMS MEAN. 
Due process requires the legislature to define "a criminal offense with 'sufficient 
defmiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a 
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."1 (State's 
Brief, 24-25 (citing Salt Lake Citv v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259,1265 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)).) 
Hardy maintains the criminal provisions at issue here violate due process. 
As set forth in Hardy's opening brief and above, the legislature did not define the 
terms "contacting," "communicating," "directly or indirectly," as those terms are used in 
the criminal provisions. (Brief of Appellant, Points I.A.(2).) The state does not offer any 
definitions. (See State's Brief, generally.) 
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The legislature's failure to adequately define the terms prevented Hardy from 
knowing what was prohibited by the statute so that he could act accordingly,8 and it 
impermissibly delegated basic policy matters to the judge and jury for resolution on an ad 
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application. Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); State v. Blowers. 
717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986) (finding due process violation where statute failed to 
adequately define prohibited conduct); (Brief of Appellant, Point II.A. and B.). 
The state disputes that the criminal provisions at issue are vague, and it asserts that 
Hardy was adequately advised that communicating "to Ms. Hardy" would constitute an 
offense. (State's Brief, 27.) That argument disregards that in this case, Hardy did not 
communicate "to" or with Courtney. Rather, Hardy was prosecuted for sending letters to 
his children about Courtney and his feelings. Application of the provisions in this case 
violated due process. Blowers. 717 P.2d 1321. 
The state also asserts that "defendant was not subjected] to arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement" of the vague provisions in this matter, and "the jury was not asked to 
decide" whether the criminal provisions could be construed to apply to the facts in this 
case. (State's Brief, 27.) Again, the state's argument disregards proceedings in the lower 
court. There, counsel for Hardy argued that because the June letters were addressed to 
Hardy's children, there was no basis to find that the letters constituted a communication 
8 Although Hardy was advised that he was prohibited from writing to Courtney, he was 
not advised that he was prohibited from writing to his children for any reason. 
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to Courtney. Hardy's counsel also argued that if the court considered the evidence to be 
sufficient to send the matter to the jury, the protective order and relevant statutes were 
unconstitutional as criminal provisions. (Case No. 873, R. 178:135-40); see Blower, 717 
P.2d 1321 (defendant argued that if the statutory provisions, which prohibited driving 
while under the influence, applied to riding a horse, they were unconstitutional). 
The trial judge rejected Hardy's constitutional arguments concerning application 
of the provisions and ruled that Hardy's arguments must be "made to the jury" in an effort 
to convince the jury that the provisions did not reach the conduct. (Case No. 873, R. 
178:140-41.) With that ruling, the trial court failed in its gate-keeping function. It 
allowed the jury to consider the reach of the protective order and statutory provisions. 
As set forth in Hardy's opening brief, the trial court gave the jury license to create 
its own standard for determining whether the conduct was criminal under the relevant 
provisions. That was improper. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court criticized such an ap-
proach in Gooding v. Wilson. 405 U.S. 518 (1972). There, the Court considered a statute 
that made it unlawful to utter "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a 
breach of the peace." Id. at 519. The Court found the statute unconstitutionally vague/ 
overbroad. It also took the Georgia Supreme Court to task for failing to limit the scope of 
the statute, and for giving juries license to create their "own standard" for application of 
the statute on a case-by-case basis. Id at 528 (cite omitted). 
The criminal provisions at issue here are more troubling than the provisions in 
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Gooding. The provisions here were used to criminalize Hardy's letters to his children, 
containing expressions of remorse, information about friends, and a recipe for stuffed 
trout. That is unconstitutional. "We conclude that '[t]he separation of legitimate from 
illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive tools than [the lower court] has supplied.'" 
Gooding. 405 U.S. at 528 (cite omitted). The trial court erred in allowing this case to go 
to the jury. (See Brief of Appellant, Point II.B.) 
C. THE STATE'S PRESERVATION AND STANDING ARGUMENTS LACK 
MERIT. 
(1) The Constitutional Challenges Were Properly Preserved. 
According to the state, Hardy "has preserved his over breadth claim" as it relates to 
"his felony convictions in Case No. 991200873." (State's Brief, 19.) The state asserts 
Hardy failed to properly preserve the remaining constitutional issues. (See State's Brief, 
Points III, IV.) The state's "wavier" arguments should be disregarded as follows. 
(a) Case No. 873: With respect to the felony case, the state admits Hardy properly 
preserved "over breadth." (State's Brief, 19.) Under the law, a provision that is overly 
broad may also be vague. Indeed, a vague/overbroad provision fails to define relevant 
terms, and it is not carefully tailored to reach only criminal conduct; it embraces innocent 
conduct. Vagueness and overbreadth are related concepts.9 
9 See Brief of Appellant, 31-32 (citing Reno. 521 U.S. at 871-72; Gravned. 408 U.S. at 
108-09; Edwards v. Louisiana. 372 U.S. 229,236-37 (1963); State v. Pierson. 476 
N.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Neb. 1991) (overbreadth embraces vagueness); Stock v. State. 526 
P.2d 3,7-8 (Alaska 1974) ("overbreadth" is an aspect of the vagueness analysis)). 
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Under the vagueness/overbreadth analysis, this Court will consider whether the 
provisions at issue give a person of "ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited"; whether the provisions are sufficiently explicit to ensure 
objective and uniform application; and whether the provisions "abut[] upon sensitive 
areas of basic First Amendment freedoms." Gravned. 408 U.S. at 108-09. Where Hardy 
properly challenged the provisions as overbroad and indefinite, this Court may consider 
the matter under each prong of the Gravned analysis. (See Case No. 873, R. 178:135-42.) 
(b) Case No. 131: The state claims Hardy failed to properly preserve the constitu-
tional issues in the misdemeanor Case No. 131. This Court should disregard the state's 
claim for at least three reasons. First, Case Nos. 131 and 873 are companion cases. Each 
case involved the same parties and attorneys; the convictions were entered in each case 
based on the same facts;10 the same judge entered judgment in each case; and the same 
judge considered the constitutional arguments in each matter.11 
10 In the misdemeanor case (Case No. 131), Hardy was charged with violating the pro-
tective order in January 1999. The trial judge agreed to hold a plea in abeyance for that 
violation for a year so long as Hardy did not otherwise violate the protective order. 
Thereafter, the state charged Hardy with the violations at issue in Case No. 873, for 
mailing letters to his children in June 1999. Based on evidence of the June letters, the 
trial judge in Case No. 131 withdrew the plea in abeyance and entered a guilty plea 
against Hardy in Case No. 131 for the misdemeanor conviction. 
The June letters served as the basis for withdrawal of the plea in abeyance and 
entry of the guilty plea in Case No. 131, and as the basis for the felony convictions in 
Case No. 873. 
11 Contrary to the state's assertions, Hardy is not challenging the entry of the plea in 
abeyance in Case No. 991200131. (See State's Brief, 16.) Hardy's challenge on appeal 
relates to the trial court's ruling that Hardy later violated the protective order when he 
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Prior to the entry of judgment in Case No. 131, Hardy presented and fully litigated 
the constitutional issues in Case No. 873 as they related to the facts and law in both cases. 
The trial judge rejected Hardy's argument. (Case No. 873 at 178:135-42.) Thereafter, the 
trial judge entered judgment in both cases, and within 10 days, Hardy filed a motion to 
alter or amend in Case No. 131. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) (motion to amend), 81(e) (civil 
rules apply in a criminal case); (Case No. 131, R. 70-73). The rules allow for such a 
motion in order that a trial judge may assess a question of law relating to the entry of 
judgment. See Tebbs & Tebbs v. Oliveto, 256 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1953). The trial court 
was not required to take new evidence on the issue. The court specifically limited its 
ruling to the question of law involved. 
In Case No. 131, Hardy raised the question of law that was addressed in the com-
panion Case No. 873. He referenced the arguments already presented to the judge, that 
the criminal provisions at issue were unconstitutional. (Case No. 131, R. 70-73; see also 
Case No. 873, R. 178:135-42.) The argument implicated the Gravned analysis as set forth 
above. (See supra, Point II.C.(l)(a); Brief of Appellant, Point II.) The trial court denied 
the motion in both cases. (Case No. 131:73; Case No. 873 at 178:135-42.) That ruling 
was all that was necessary to properly preserve the issue for appeal in Case No. 131. 
sent letters to his children on June 7 and June 24. Based on that determination, the trial 
judge withdrew the plea in abeyance and entered a guilty plea against Hardy. 
Also, Hardy has consistently maintained that the letters did not constitute a viola-
tion of the protective order, where the order did not prohibit Hardy from communicating 
with his children. Contrary to the state's assertion, in Case No. 131 Hardy did not enter a 
guilty plea with respect to the letters. (See State's Brief, 16 and 18.) 
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Since Case Nos. 131 and 873 are companion cases, where the convictions were 
entered based on the same facts, and the constitutional arguments were presented to the 
same judge, a determination in one case necessarily affects the second. As a matter of 
judicial economy and fundamental fairness, the trial court's ruling in Case No. 873 should 
be deemed sufficient for preservation of the issues in the companion Case No. 131. 
Second, in connection with the state's waiver argument, the state has cited to Rule 
12(d), Utah R. Crim. P., and Estate of Covington v. Josephson. 888 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994), cert denied 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). They are inapplicable. 
In Covington, after parties to a civil dispute filed cross motions for summary 
judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. Covington, 888 P.2d at 676-77. 
Defendants subsequently filed a post-summary-judgment motion to alter or amend, which 
the trial court "simply denied." Id. at 678 & n. 5. On appeal, defendants asked this Court 
to consider arguments raised in the post-summary-judgment motion. It refused to do so 
on the basis that the arguments were untimely below; they were waived. Id at 678. 
Covington is inapplicable here, where the trial judge in Hardy's case fully 
addressed the merits of Hardy's claims in the companion Case No. 873. Since the 
constitutional issues were presented on the same facts and arguments before the same 
judge in Case No. 873, they were preserved in Case No. 131. 
Also, where the trial court in Covington would be required to take evidence to 
resolve the post-summary-judgment motion, here that was not the case. Indeed, since the 
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same arguments were raised in Case Nos. 873, the trial judge only had to rule on the 
matter in Case No. 131 to preserve the constitutional issues. 
With respect to Rule 12(d), Utah R. Crim. P., it provides that failure to "timely 
raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial or at 
the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown 
may grant relief from such waiver." The state's reliance on Rule 12(d) is misplaced. In 
Case No. 131, there was no "trial" and the court did not "set" a time for filing the motion 
to amend. Also, good "cause" existed for resolving the constitutional issues in Case No. 
131, where they already had been presented on a complete record in the companion case. 
Third, the state asserts Hardy waived his constitutional claims in Case No. 131 by 
pleading guilty. (State's Brief, 16 and 18.) That is incorrect. See supra, note 11. At all 
times relevant, Hardy denied that the letters to the children constituted a violation of the 
protective order, and he asked the trial court not to withdraw the plea in abeyance. (Case 
No. 131 at 93.) The trial judge rejected Hardy's arguments. (Id.) Hardy's claims are ripe 
for review and properly before this Court. 
(2) Contrary to the State's Assertion. Hardy Has "Standing." 
The state asserts Hardy lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
criminal provisions here because he has not been adversely affected by them. (State's 
Brief, Point VI.) That argument lacks merit. See Board of Airport Commissions of L.A. 
v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) ("Under the First Amendment 
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overbreadth doctrine, an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is 
permitted to challenge a statute on its face"). 
For standing, the supreme court ruled that a litigant must show a nexus between 
the statute, the injury suffered, and the relief requested. If a favorable ruling will ease the 
litigant's injury, he has standing. State v. Mace. 921 P.2d 1372,1379 (Utah 1996). 
Here, Hardy was charged and convicted of intentionally/knowingly violating the 
protective order by "contacting" or "communicating" with Courtney either directly or 
indirectly. Sections 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108 criminalize a direct/indirect 
contact /communication. The state proceeded against Hardy for a criminal conviction 
based on those provisions. During trial court proceedings, Hardy challenged the 
constitutionality of the provisions that subjected him to criminal liability. Hardy's claims 
were rejected. Hardy ultimately was convicted under the vague/overbroad provisions and 
ordered to serve a sentence at the Utah State Prison. 
In the event this Court strikes the relevant provisions as unconstitutional, Hardy 
will be entitled to the entry of an order vacating his criminal convictions. A favorable 
ruling will provide Hardy with relief. Hardy has standing to raise the issues. The state's 
argument must be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Brief of Appellant and above, Hardy respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the convictions in Case Nos. 131 and 873. 
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